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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Cesar Sepulveda contends that several of his constitutional rights were violated
in these cases. In the 2013 case, he contends his right to confront the witnesses
against him was violated by the use of L.M.’s preliminary hearing testimony due to her
unavailability at trial because he had not been afforded an adequate opportunity to
cross-examine her on certain topics, notably her history of drug use, which would show
her bias or had a motive to lie. He also contends that his due process right to present a
defense was violated by the decision to not let him present that evidence about L.M.’s
credibility on the idea that it was not relevant. In the 2014 case, he contends his right to
be free from double jeopardy was violated by the imposition of multiple sentences for
offenses which are included offenses of one another under Idaho’s pleading theory.
The State’s responses to these issues are not meritorious.

Many of its

arguments are raised under improper standards, misconstrue the arguments raised in
the Appellant’s Brief, or are inconsistent with Idaho and United States Supreme Court
precedent. Therefore, those arguments should be rejected. Because of the violations
of Mr. Sepulveda’s constitutional rights, this Court should vacate his convictions and
remand these cases for further proceedings.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Sepulveda’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.1

In the Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Sepulveda indicated that efforts were ongoing to locate
copies of some missing documents, such as the question sheets sent by the jurors
during deliberation. (App. Br., p.6 n.3.) The response from the district court indicated
that it did not have those documents. However, as the jury questions were apparently
read verbatim into the record and appear in the transcripts in the record, Mr. Sepulveda
has not pursued the matter further.
1

2

ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court violated Mr. Sepulveda’s constitutional right to confront
the witnesses against him when it granted the State’s motion to present L.M.’s
preliminary hearing testimony during trial even though he had not been afforded
an adequate opportunity to cross-examine L.M.

2.

Whether the district court violated Mr. Sepulveda’s right to present a defense by
not allowing him to present evidence challenging L.M.’s credibility based on its
erroneous conclusion that the evidence was irrelevant.

3.

Whether the district court violated Mr. Sepulveda’s constitutional right to be free
from double jeopardy under the Idaho Constitution by entering convictions and
imposing sentences for each charge in the 2014 case when one of those charges
was alleged as the means by which each of the other two charges was
committed.

4.

Whether the accumulated errors in this case require reversal even if this Court
determines them to be individually harmless.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Violated Mr. Sepulveda’s Constitutional Right To Confront The
Witnesses Against Him When It Granted The State’s Motion To Present L.M.’s
Preliminary Hearing Testimony During Trial Even Though He Had Not Been Afforded
An Adequate Opportunity To Cross-Examine L.M.
A.

Applicable Standard Of Review
The State asserts this issue should be reviewed for an abuse of the district

court’s discretion. (Resp. Br., pp.10-11; see generally Resp. Br., pp.10-21.) That is not
the proper standard of review. Rather, as the Idaho Supreme Court has held: “A trial
court has broad discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude evidence and its
judgment in the fact finding role will only be disturbed on appeal when there has been a
clear abuse of discretion. However, whether evidence is relevant is a question of law
this Court reviews de novo.”

State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 6 (2013) (emphasis from

original) (internal quotations omitted).

Similarly, constitutional questions are “purely

questions of law,” and so, they are also reviewed de novo. Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial
Council, 136 Idaho 63, 67 (2001); cf. Fields v. State, 155 Idaho 532, 534 (2013).
Mr. Sepulveda has raised a constitutional question on this issue – whether his
constitutional right to confrontation was violated by the use of L.M.’s preliminary hearing
testimony (see App. Br., p.9) – and the analysis of that question centers on the
relevance of the testimony he would have, but was not allowed to, explore during his
cross-examination of L.M. at that hearing. Therefore, all the relevant questions are
questions of law, not fact. See Joy, 155 Idaho at 6; Bradbury, 136 Idaho at 67. As a
result, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that this precise claim – whether the use of

4

a transcript of prior testimony without an adequate opportunity to cross-examination, as
required by the Constitution – “presents a question of law over which this Court
exercises free review.” State v. Mantz, 148 Idaho 303, 305 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing
State v. O’Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 245 (1990)).
Therefore, the proper standard of review on this claim is de novo review, not
abuse of discretion. As such, the State’s arguments under the abuse of discretion
standard, particularly those which call for deference to the district court’s decisions,
should be rejected as inapplicable under the proper analysis of the claim on appeal.
B.

Mr. Sepulveda Was Not Afforded An Adequate Opportunity To Cross-Examine
L.M. On A Legitimate Source Of Bias Or Motive To Lie During The Preliminary
Hearing
The State’s primary argument on this issue is that the cases upon which

Mr. Sepulveda relied do not support his contention that he was denied an adequate
opportunity to cross-examine L.M. on a source of bias or motive to lie.
Br., pp.15-19.)

(Resp.

The State’s argument is mistaken because Idaho Supreme Court

precedent is, in fact, clear that it was error to deny Mr. Sepulveda the opportunity to
cross-examine L.M. along those particular lines. The cases to which the State refers
define the scope of the right, and so, are relevant to understanding Mr. Sepulveda’s
argument. However, as he pointed out in his initial brief, those cases are factually
distinguishable from his case. Therefore, the State’s contention that those cases do not
“support” Mr. Sepulveda’s argument are without merit.
First, though, the State’s argument is mistaken because the Idaho Supreme
Court has held that a witness’s history with drugs is a relevant line of inquiry on crossexamination as it reveals a source of potential bias and motive to lie. State v. Gomez,
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137 Idaho 671, 674-75 (2002). “The partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at
trial, and is always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his
testimony.” State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 713 (1976) (internal quotation omitted). Thus,
in Gomez, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that police had found marijuana
in the home of two of the witnesses who testified against him. Id. at 674. The State
objected on the basis of relevance, and the district court sustained that objection. Id. at
674-75.
The Supreme Court reversed that decision, explaining, “[t]he questions regarding
the presence of marijuana were relevant, even though [one of the witnesses] denied
any agreement to testify in exchange for non-prosecution.” Id. at 675. That evidence
would tend to show those witnesses “had strong motivations to testify for the State.
They were growing marijuana in a residence with children. This could have resulted in
a felony prosecution. They were not prosecuted. The jury could have concluded that
they testified for the State to avoid prosecution, and this could have influence the
evaluation of their credibility.” Id. Thus, the Court concluded, “[t]his type of crossexamination that is routinely allowed to determine whether witnesses have a motive to
testify that may bring their credibility into question. Cross-examination should have
been allowed.” Id.
The evidence Mr. Sepulveda sought to impeach L.M.’s credibility with was similar
to the evidence the defendant in Gomez sought to introduce. He wanted to question
L.M. about her having methamphetamine in the family home. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1,
p.26, L.20 - p.27, L.9 (officer’s testimony about Mr. Sepulveda’s version of events);
Tr., Vol.1, p.17, Ls.7-16 (attempt to cross-examine L.M. on this topic).)

6

L.M.’s

possession of methamphetamine could have resulted in a felony prosecution. See,
e.g., I.C. § 37-2732(c). However, she was not arrested. (See Tr., Vol.4, p.212, Ls.4-8
(officer’s testimony that was initially going to arrest L.M., but did not once L.M. made
accusations against Mr. Sepulveda.)2 Nor does it appear L.M. was ever prosecuted on
that basis. (See generally R., Tr.; see also Online Repository.) Thus, for the same
reasons discussed in Gomez, the information Mr. Sepulveda sought to explore on
cross-examination was relevant to L.M.’s credibility. Compare Gomez, 137 Idaho at
674-75. Therefore, as in Gomez, he should have been allowed to cross-examine L.M.
on those topics.
The decisions in State v. Richardson and State v. Mantz articulate the scope of
that rule. See State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 524 (2014); Mantz, 148 Idaho 303. The
State fails to appreciate this aspect of those decisions, and so, argues they do not
support Mr. Sepulveda’s claim for relief because they call for a case-by-case evaluation
of the associate right to confrontation. (Resp. Br., p.18.) While it is true that those
cases call for a case-by-case analysis, Mr. Sepulveda contended they were
distinguishable on the facts of his case (i.e., employed a case-by-case analysis)
because, unlike in Richardson and Mantz, Mr. Sepulveda was not afforded any
opportunity to cross-examine L.M. on the relevant topic. Thus, the State’s argument is
irrelevant to the actual issue raised on appeal.

In fact, the record reveals the State initially sought to prosecute Mr. Sepulveda for the
possession of methamphetamine, rather than L.M. (R., pp.56-57.) The possession
charge against Mr. Sepulveda was subsequently dropped by the State. (See
R., pp.166-67.)
2
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Properly understanding Richardson and Mantz, it becomes clear that, evaluating
the facts of this case, Mr. Sepulveda was denied his confrontation right. For example,
the Supreme Court explained in Richardson that the defendant had been allowed to
question the witness about “his prior felony conviction [and] his drug addiction” during
the previous hearing. Richardson, 156 Idaho at 529. As such, that defendant had been
afforded an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness about that potential
source of bias, and thus, that testimony was properly used during the ensuing jury trial.
Id. The Court specifically noted that, while it may not have been the best opportunity, in
that the defendant might have wanted to be more aggressive in his questioning, he had
still been afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witness on those topics, and
that was the reason there was no constitutional issue with presenting the prior testimony
at the subsequent trial. Id. The same conclusion is evidenced in Mantz. Mantz, 148
Idaho at 310-11.
However, unlike those cases, Mr. Sepulveda was not allowed to explore that line
of inquiry at all.

The prosecutor objected to relevance after Mr. Sepulveda’s first

question to L.M. in regard to her history of drug use. (Tr., Vol.1, p.17, Ls.7-11.) The
district court sustained that objection without caveat. (Tr., Vol.1, p.17, L.16.) Therefore,
Mr. Sepulveda was afforded no opportunity to cross-examine L.M. on those topics, and
so, he was not allowed to establish the witness’s source of bias or motive to lie. That is
a significant, constitutionally infirm limitation on the scope and nature of his crossexamination of L.M. See e.g., Gomez, 137 Idaho at 674-75; White, 97 Idaho at 713. As
a result, the district court’s decision to allow L.M.’s preliminary hearing testimony to be
presented at the jury trial violated Mr. Sepulveda’s constitutional rights.
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C.

Defense Counsel Made A Sufficient Offer Of Proof On The New, Significant, And
Material Information He Expected That An Adequate Opportunity To CrossExamine L.M. Would Have Yielded
The State contends that trial counsel’s offer of proof as to what he expected the

cross-examination of L.M. to have revealed was insufficient to make out the
constitutional claim because trial counsel’s second alleged problem with the opportunity
to cross-examine L.M. – that the defense team did not have L.M.’s medical records at
the preliminary hearing, and so, could not adequately question her – was disproved by
the record. (See Resp. Br., p.20 (citing, among others, Tr., Vol.3, p.27, Ls.16-21).) To
be clear, as the prosecutor revealed, the medical records in question were L.M.’s
psychiatric records. (Tr., Vol.3, p.32, Ls.13-17.) While the district court made no finding
of fact as to whether the defense team actually had those records prior to the
preliminary hearing (see generally R., Tr.), the record does show that, prior to the
preliminary hearing, the magistrate had found L.M.’s medical records relevant and
ordered they could be discovered to defense counsel. (R., pp.20-22.) Nevertheless,
the State’s argument is mistaken for two reasons.
First, trial counsel did not invoke the absence of the medical records in regard to
his contention that the opportunity to cross-examine L.M. on her drug use was
inadequate. Rather, he only discussed the absence of the medical records in regard to
his contention that the opportunity to cross-examine L.M. on her mental health issues
was inadequate.
Trial counsel’s whole argument regarding the opportunity to cross-examine was
as follows:
I think it’s on page 16 [of the preliminary hearing transcript].
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[Preliminary hearing counsel] had asked: “Have you ever harmed
yourself?”
There was an objection to relevance. [Preliminary hearing counsel]
proffered that it was relevant, that she may lay more foundation.
I think although she went forward with a line of questioning, it didn’t
fully develop the concept of whether [L.M.] had harmed herself.
Our belief is that there was a mental health condition, that one of
the symptoms of that mental health condition is self-mutilation or inflicting
harm to one’s self as part of the diagnosis that became light or became
more clear once we received some medical records.
We didn’t have the ability at the time to lay a sufficient foundation to
develop that line of questioning, and in addition to that, we were
somewhat shut down by the state’s objection and the court upholding that
or sustaining that objection.
There was another time when the state also objected to the line of
questioning which prevented an adequate opportunity for us or an
adequate cross examination of [L.M.]. So I believe, I mean, our stance is
that numbers two and three of the analysis have not been satisfied.
It’s more than just saying we had an opportunity to cross examine,
but it’s more of an adequate opportunity to cross examine.
We didn’t have -- we did not have the medical records. We didn’t
have a full understanding, or that she may even had [sic] a mental health
condition. She denied that, and in some of the questions of seeing a
medical doctor or any other type of doctors or any other types of
counselors.
She also denied any use of methamphetamine or any other types
of illegal substances. And there was an objection to that when asked if
she had been using earlier in the week. So we weren’t able to explore
that further and perhaps develop more of a credibility issue.
And because of those things, Your Honor, I don’t think the state has
satisfied that the analysis is complete and that this preliminary hearing
transcript should be admitted.
(Tr., Vol.3, p.28, L.5 - p.30, L.2; compare Tr., Vol.1, p.16, L.16 - p.17, L.1 (the portion of
the preliminary hearing to which trial counsel was referring.)
As trial counsel’s comments demonstrate, he referred to the medical records in
articulating why the defense team’s ability to cross-examine L.M. on her mental health
issues was not adequate. For example, L.M.’s history of self-harm, which was part of
Mr. Sepulveda’s version of events (that L.M. had inflicted the injuries the officers saw on
herself (see, e.g., Tr., Vol.4, p.350, Ls.21-23)), “became more clear once we received
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the medical records.”

(Tr., Vol.3, p.28, Ls.14-19.)

Similarly, “we did not have the

medical records. We didn’t have a full understanding, or that she may even had [sic] a
mental health condition,” and so, could not adequately cross-examine on that topic.
(Tr., Vol.3, p.29, L.11-17.) That trial counsel was invoking the medical records only as
to the ability to cross-examine on L.M.’s mental health issues is consistent with the
prosecutor’s clarification that the records being referred to were L.M.’s “psychiatric
notes from her psychologist, not the actual medical records from [L.M.’s] two talks with
the paramedics, her visit to Saint Alphonsus.” (Tr., Vol.3, p.32, Ls.13-17.) Thus, the
absence of the medical records was not in regard to the opportunity to cross-examine
L.M. on her drug use. Because the ability to cross-examine L.M. on her drug use is the
only of these two issues challenged on appeal (see generally App. Br.), the State’s
reliance on the fact that the defense team had the psychiatric records is irrelevant.
Therefore, this Court should not give weight to that argument.
Second, even if the medical records were invoked in regard to the opportunity to
cross examine L.M. about her drug use, trial counsel articulated a second, separate
basis for the constitutional challenge which sufficiently identified information he
anticipated an adequate cross-examination would have revealed.

Specifically, trial

counsel argued that “[L.M.] also denied any use of methamphetamine or any other
types of illegal substances. And there was an objection to that when asked if she had
been using earlier in the week. So we weren’t able to explore that further and perhaps
develop more of a credibility issue there.” (Tr., Vol.3, p.29, Ls.18-23.) Trial counsel
also explained that, had cross-examination on that topic been allowed, the defense
team would have been able to impeach her testimony on direct examination, that “[s]he
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also denied any use of methamphetamines or any other types of illegal substances.”
(Tr., Vol.3, p.29, Ls.18-20).

That impeaching information is significant, material

information that was not included in the testimony read to the jury. Compare, e.g.,
Gomez, 137 Idaho at 675 (holding that cross-examination into precisely those sort of
questions should have been allowed). Therefore, the State’s medical-records argument
is further revealed to be misplaced. Even without that justification, trial counsel still
made a sufficient argument to establish the violation of Mr. Sepulveda’s confrontation
right.
Finally, the State asserts that, because Mr. Sepulveda was able to present some
evidence of L.M.’s drug use at the trial, the use of the transcript of L.M.’s preliminary
hearing testimony was not problematic. (Resp. Br., pp.20-21.) The State’s argument in
that regard is contrary to Idaho Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court
precedent.
In a similar case, the Idaho Supreme Court held that, even though counsel had
referred to a particular line of evidence at the trial, he had still been denied his right to
cross-examine a particular witness in regard to that line of evidence. White, 97 Idaho at
713 n.6. Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded, the subsequent presentation of
evidence did not cure the violation of his right to confrontation. Id.
In reaching that conclusion, the Idaho Supreme Court cited the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974). There, the
Supreme Court held that errors such as this, where the defendant is denied his right to
confrontation, are “constitutional error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing
of want of prejudice would cure it.” Id. (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added).
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However, the United States Supreme Court subsequently explained that this is not a per
se rule mandating reversal.

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 683 (1986).

Nevertheless, it reaffirmed that, where the district court completely shuts off the
opportunity to cross-examine a potential source of bias, that is a constitutional violation:
the trial court prohibited all inquiry into the possibility that [the witness]
would be biased as a result of the State’s dismissal of his pending public
drunkenness charge. By thus cutting off all questioning about an event
that the State consented had taken place and that a jury might reasonably
have found furnished the witness a motive for favoring the prosecution in
his testimony, the court’s ruling violated respondent’s rights secured by
the Confrontation Clause.
Id. at 678. Thus, it held: “Respondent, like Harrington,[3] was denied an opportunity to
cast doubt on the testimony of an adverse witness. In both cases the prosecution was
thus able to introduce evidence that was not subject to constitutionally adequate crossexamination.” Id. at 683 (leaving the question of harmlessness to the state courts, as it
had not reached that issue originally). Therefore, the State’s argument based on the
evidence Mr. Sepulveda was able to present on that point at trial is erroneous and
should be rejected.
And while the United States Supreme Court left open the possibility that errors in
this regard might be harmless, see id., the State has not argued that this error in this
regard is harmlessness.

(See generally Resp. Br., pp.10-21 (the State’s entire

argument as to the Confrontation Clause); compare, e.g., Resp. Br., p.26 (expressly
arguing harmless error on Issue II, regarding whether Mr. Sepulveda’s due process right
to present a defense was violated by determining his cross-examination into L.M.’s
potential sources of bias was irrelevant).) The Idaho Supreme Court has held that,

3

See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
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when the State does not specifically argue harmless error on an issue, it fails to meet its
burden to prove the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt:

“the State never

specifically argues that Hust’s identification did not ‘contribute to the verdict obtained’ as
clearly required under Perry. For example, the subject is not even discussed in the
State’s written brief on appeal . . . . Therefore, this Court finds that the State failed to
meet its burden of proving that the error is harmless.” State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584,
598-99 (2013).

Since the State, as it did in Almaraz, has not specifically argued

harmlessness on this particular issue, it has failed to meet its burden in that regard on
this issue.
Even if this Court were to consider a harmless error argument, however, for the
same reasons explained by the United States Supreme Court in Van Arsdell, the State
has failed to carry its burden of showing this error was harmless. See Van Arsdall, 475
U.S. at 683. The State was able to admit L.M’s testimony without L.M. having been
subjected to cross-examination on topics showing her bias or motive to lie. Because
this case turned on the jury’s credibility determination, there is a reasonable possibility
that L.M.’s erroneously-admitted testimony contributed to the verdict rendered in this
case, which means the error was not harmless. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.
275, 279 (1993) (articulating the proper analysis under the harmless error test).
Therefore, this Court should vacate Mr. Sepulveda’s conviction in this case
because it was based on the erroneous admission of L.M.’s preliminary hearing
testimony in violation of his constitutional right to confrontation.
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II.
The District Court Violated Mr. Sepulveda’s Right To Present A Defense By Not
Allowing Him To Present Evidence Challenging L.M.’s Credibility Based On Its
Erroneous Conclusion That The Evidence Was Irrelevant
A.

Applicable Standard Of Review
As with is argument on the Confrontation Clause issue, the State contends this

issue should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Resp. Br., p.22.) Again, the State
misunderstands the argument raised, and so, is arguing under the wrong standard of
review. This issue presents more than just an evidentiary ruling on the relevance of an
objection; it contends that Mr. Sepulveda’s constitutional right to due process4 was
violated because the ruling prevented him from presenting his defense to the jury.
(App. Br., pp.20-21.) Idaho’s courts have recognized that this is a valid constitutional
claim. State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 239 (2009); State v. Karpach, 146 Idaho 736,
739-41 (Ct. App. 2009).
Constitutional questions are “purely questions of law,” and so, they are also
reviewed de novo. Bradbury, 136 Idaho at 67; cf. Fields, 155 Idaho at 534. Since this
issue presents constitutional challenge, the proper standard of appellate review is de
novo.

Therefore, this Court should reject the State’s arguments under the wrong

standard, particularly those which call for deference to the district court’s decisions.
B.

This Issue Is Properly Challenged As Preserved Error
While the error in this regard was initially the product of the magistrate’s ruling at

the preliminary hearing, the facts of this case, particularly the fact that L.M.’s preliminary

4

U.S. Const. amend XIV.
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hearing testimony was substituted for live testimony at trial due to her unavailability,
demonstrate that the same objection was, of necessity, made and ruled on during L.M.’s
“trial testimony.”

Therefore, Mr. Sepulveda claims that he should be allowed to

challenge that ruling as preserved error.
The State’s primary argument for why the issue should be seen as unpreserved
is based on the idea that Mr. Sepulveda did not specifically ask the district court to
make evidentiary rulings in regard to L.M.’s testimony. (Resp. Br., p.23.) First, that
argument ignores the facts of this case, as the parties did ask the district court to rule on
the admissibility of L.M.’s preliminary hearing testimony. (See Tr., Vol.3, p.26, L.13 p.34, L.3.)

The district court rejected Mr. Sepulveda’s arguments as to why that

testimony should not be admitted and ordered that L.M.’s entire preliminary hearing
testimony was admissible. (Tr., Vol.3, p.34, L.4 - p.37, L.10; Tr., Vol.3, p.38, L.23 p.40, L.2.) Therefore, there was a specific request for an evidentiary ruling in regard to
L.M.’s testimony; the district court determined it was all admissible. As such, errors in
that determination, including the erroneous limitation on cross-examination are properly
reviewed on appeal.
Second, the effect of the State’s argument would be that trial counsel had to
request the district court effectively reverse the magistrate’s determination of irrelevancy
and allow further cross-examination into L.M.’s sources of bias. Such a motion, based
on the facts of this case, would only serve to waste judicial resources because that relief
was not available – L.M. was deceased and not able to answer relevant additional
questions.
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This, then, is more like the situation the Idaho Supreme Court addressed in
State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240 (1999). In that case, which dealt with the propriety
of the jury instructions, the defendant did not raise an objection to the jury instructions
when it appeared that the district court had already made a final ruling on the matter.
Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the defendant did not need to raise an objection
in that situation for the issue to be properly considered on appeal. Id. As the Supreme
Court later explained, when a matter had been discussed and the court had reached a
decision, meaning an objection would not serve a practical purpose, the decision could
be properly reviewed on appeal. State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 448-49 (2012). As
in those cases, the request the State insists should have been made here would serve
no practical purpose. Therefore, the lack of such an objection should not bar appellate
review of that issue.
Finally, the nature of the presentation of L.M.’s testimony to the jury dictates that
the objection and ruling thereon were made at the trial level. The point of playing the
preliminary hearing testimony was to make it as though L.M. was giving that same
testimony in the trial itself. The record bears that conclusion out. A recording of L.M.’s
preliminary hearing testimony was played without modification for the jury. The jury was
instructed to consider L.M.’s evidence alongside the trial testimony of the other
witnesses.

(See, e.g., R., p.200 (instructing the jury to consider all the evidence

including the sworn testimony of witnesses and exhibits admitted into evidence);
R., p.190 (instructing the jury that they were to evaluate all the evidence in their
determination of the facts).)
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That means, as a matter of practical effect, during the trial, L.M. was asked on
cross-examination if she had used methamphetamine in the days preceding the event.
(See Tr., Vol.1, p.17, Ls.7-9.) The prosecutor objected to that question on relevance
grounds. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.17, L.11.) As with any other objection to the admissibility of
such evidence, the trial court had to rule on that objection. The ruling on the record is
that the prosecutor’s relevancy objection was sustained. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.17, L.16.)
Since the district court did not articulate any contrary ruling, it must have, by necessity
of the particular facts of this case, also sustained the prosecutor’s relevancy objection.
No other interpretation of the presentation of that evidence makes sense, nor does the
State proffer any alternative view of that evidence. (See generally Resp. Br.)
That conclusion is consistent with the rules about law of the case for a similar
situation where one judge succeeds another in presiding over a case.

Unless the

successor judge is going to reverse a prior decision, the initial decision will be
considered as still controlling on the issue. Thus, it will continue to govern the same
issues in subsequent stages of that case. Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating
Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 815-16 (1988). Under those circumstances, that ruling can be
challenged on appeal. Here, that means the decision that the cross-examination into
L.M.’s drug history was not relevant is the valid ruling governing the scope of
Mr. Sepulveda’s cross-examination of L.M. The State offers no argument against that
analysis. (See generally Resp. Br.) Therefore, it was a preserved issue because the
trial court necessarily had to rule on it. See, e.g., State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553
(1998). As such, it is properly raised in this appeal and this Court should consider the
merits of that argument.
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However, even if the State is correct, this Court should still consider this claim
under the fundamental error framework. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010)
(setting forth the fundamental error framework).

The error affects Mr. Sepulveda’s

unwaived constitutional right to due process by preventing him from presenting his
defense. Meister, 148 Idaho at 239 (“The right to present a defense includes the right
to offer testimony of witnesses, compel their attendance, and to present the defendant’s
version of facts to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies.”) (internal quotation
omitted); Karpach, 146 Idaho at 739-41 (finding a denial of this right when the defendant
was not allowed to present relevant evidence which would contradict the testimony of
one of the State’s witnesses). The relevant facts are clear from the face of the record.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.17, Ls.7-16.) And, for the same reasons discussed in detail in Section
II(D), infra, there is a reasonable possibility that this error contributed to the verdict
rendered since this case turned on the jury’s credibility determinations. As such, it was
prejudicial.
C.

Since Cross-Examination Into L.M.’s Potential Sources Of Bias Or Motive To Lie
Was Relevant, The Exclusion Of That Evidence Violated Mr. Sepulveda’s Right
To Present His Defense
On the merits of this issue, Mr. Sepulveda contends that, by determining his

attempt to cross-examine L.M. on a potential sources of bias was irrelevant, the courts
denied him his due process right to present a defense. The State, however, would
break this issue into two distinct claims – a challenge to the determination that crossexamining L.M. on her history of drug use was irrelevant and a challenge to the
determination that the nature of L.M.’s death was irrelevant. (See Resp. Br., pp.22-26.)
That is a superficial distinction at best.
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Both challenges are based on the fact that Mr. Sepulveda was trying to impeach
L.M.’s direct testimony wherein she denied any use of methamphetamine.

As trial

counsel explained, “[s]he also denied any use of methamphetamine or any other type of
illegal substances . . . we weren’t able to explore that further and perhaps develop more
of a credibility issue.”

(Tr., Vol.3, p.29, Ls.18-23.) Similarly, as to the nature of her

passing, “it does relate to this case, where she has continued to struggle with drug
abuse, and that goes to the weight of her testimony.” (Tr., Vol.4, p.13, L.20) Therefore,
the two points are not distinct from one another, and the State’s attempt to so separate
them is mistaken.

Basically, this comes down to the fact that, if Mr. Sepulveda is

correct in either respect, his right to present his defense was denied because he was
not allowed to present his version of the facts to the jury. See Meister, 148 Idaho at
239; Karpach, 146 Idaho at 739-41.
Furthermore, the merits of this issue are essentially settled by application of
Idaho Supreme Court precedent. As discussed in Section I, supra, the Supreme Court
held in Gomez that cross-examination into the witness’s drug use was relevant because
it exposed bias and a motive to lie derived from the witness’s desire to avoid
prosecution for that drug use. Gomez, 137 Idaho at 674-75; cf. White, 97 Idaho at 713
(explaining that cross-examination into a witness’s potential biases and motives to lie is
“always relevant”).

Therefore, cross-examination into those relevant issues “should

have been allowed.”

Gomez, 137 Idaho at 675.

The decision which foreclosed

Mr. Sepulveda from engaging in precisely that type of cross-examination was similarly
erroneous, as it denied him the ability to present evidence (witness testimony) that
would contradict the testimony elicited from L.M. on direct examination.
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That same analysis is applicable to the nature of L.M.’s passing – it impacts the
credibility of her testimony that she had not used methamphetamine. (See Tr., Vol.1,
p.16, Ls.3-4.) This is not, as the State believes, an assertion that “because L.M. had
methamphetamine in her system when she committed suicide, it shows she was
struggling with methamphetamine use on the day in question.” (Resp. Br., p.25.) That
would be an improper logical connection to draw, and so, Mr. Sepulveda did not draw it.
(See generally App. Br.) Rather, Mr. Sepulveda argued below and continues to argue
on appeal that it is evidence relevant to the credibility of L.M.’s testimony on direct
examination: “it does relate to this case, where she has continued to struggle with drug
abuse, and that goes to the weight of her testimony.” (Tr., Vol.4, p.13, L.20; cf. App.
Br., p.20 (pointing out that the State was allowed to refer to events following the incident
in question to try and bolster L.M.’s credibility, and so, her continuing methamphetamine
use and its impact on her behavior was also relevant to her credibility).) Therefore,
evidence that she continued to use methamphetamine, shown by the overdose, tends to
show her bias, her motive to give untrue testimony, and so, it is relevant. I.R.E. 401;
see White, 97 Idaho at 713. “Evidence that goes to the credibility of the complaining
witness is normally admitted under a broad standard.” Joy, 155 Idaho 13. Therefore,
Mr. Sepulveda should have been allowed to present that evidence.
Finally, the fact that L.M. continued to use methamphetamine remains relevant to
her credibility regardless of the fact that L.M. may have used that methamphetamine
along with other prescribed medication. (See Resp. Br., pp.24-25 (arguing that the
presence of the prescribed mediation renders this evidence irrelevant).) The State’s
arguments to the contrary speak to the weight of that evidence, not its admissibility.
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Compare State v. Lopez-Orozco, 159 Idaho 375, 386 (2015) (examining a witness’s
prior inconsistent statements under hearsay rules, and explaining that “[w]hile it
certainly goes to the weight of this evidence, it does not impact [the] admissibility” of
that witness’s subsequent statements). Such questions about the weight of admissible
evidence are appropriately left to the jury to determine. See, e.g., McKim v. Horner, 143
Idaho 568, 572-73 (2006) (“Weighing the evidence, including the credibility of
witnesses, is within the province of the trier of fact—the jury.”); State v. Bolton, 119
Idaho 846, 850 (Ct. App. 1991) (same). Therefore the district court’s determination –
that Mr. Sepulveda would not be allowed to present evidence about L.M.’s drug use for
the reason that it was not relevant – is erroneous and should be vacated.
D.

The State Has Applied The Wrong Standard In Its Assertion That This Error Was
Harmless
The State contends this error was harmless in light of the other evidence it

presented.

(Resp. Br., p.26.)

That argument applies the wrong standard, as it

effectively asks this Court to sit as a thirteenth juror and conclude that, absent those
errors, the verdict would be the same.
The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that, when errors are objected-to
below, Idaho’s courts apply the harmless error test articulated in Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967). State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). Under Chapman, the
Idaho Supreme Court explained, “a reversal is necessitated, unless the State proves
‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained.’” Id. (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24) (emphasis from Perry).

22

The United States Supreme Court has also clarified precisely what that analysis
requires the appellate courts to decide. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993).
“Consistent with the jury-trial guarantee,[5] the question [Chapman] instructs the
reviewing court to consider is not what effect the constitutional error might generally be
expected to have upon a reasonable jury, but rather what effect it had upon the guilty
verdict in the case at hand.” Id. Therefore, “[h]armless-error review looks, we have
said, to the basis on which ‘the jury actually rested its verdict.’” Id. (quoting Yates v.
Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404 (1991) (emphasis from Sullivan)).
As such, the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument the
State now advances here: “The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that
occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered.” Id. “That
must be so,” the Supreme Court explained, “because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that
was never in fact rendered—no matter how inescapable the findings to support that
verdict might be—would violate the jury trial guarantee.”

Id. (emphasis added).

Therefore, this Court should refuse to, as the State encourages it to do, consider
whether, in a trial without the error, the same verdict would have been rendered. No
matter how inescapable the conclusions the State advances might be, adopting its
argument would create an independent violation of Mr. Sepulveda’s constitutional right
to a jury trial.
Instead, this Court should apply the proper, constitutional analysis, which,
according to the United States Supreme Court, is to determine “whether the guilty
verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to these error. Id. The

5

U.S. Const. amend V.
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State has failed to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the errors did not contribute
to the verdict rendered in this case.
This case turned on a credibility determination between Mr. Sepulveda’s version
of events and the State’s version of events. (See generally Tr., Vol.4.) Mr. Sepulveda’s
version of events was that L.M. attacked him when he confronted her about her stash of
methamphetamine. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.4, p.343, L.18 - p.354, L.7 (Mr. Sepulveda’s
account on direct examination at trial).) The State’s version of events, based on L.M.’s
testimony and the neighbor’s testimony, was that Mr. Sepulveda was the primary
aggressor. (Tr., Vol.1, p.10, L.1 - p.13, L.20 (L.M.’s account on direct examination at
the preliminary hearing); Tr., Vol.4, p.149, L.1 - p.152, L.25 (the neighbor’s account on
direct examination at trial).)

As such, the question came down to which of those

versions of events the jury believed.
During deliberations, the jury sent a question which provides insight on that point,
as the jurors asked whether a person acting in self-defense could be guilty of attempted
strangulation. (Tr., Vol.4, p.483, Ls.9-12.) That question indicates that at least one
juror had doubts about the credibility of the State’s version of events. Compare State v.
Thomas, 157 Idaho 916, 919-20 (2015) (holding that, in a case where a jury question
revealed that at least one juror had concerns about the credibility of the State’s version
of events, the State had failed to show that the errors in that case were harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.) Therefore, as in Thomas, this Court should conclude that
the State has failed to meet its burden under the proper standard for harmless error.
Furthermore, the jury’s question reveals that, contrary to the State’s assertion,
the evidence in this case was not as strong as the State believes, regardless of the
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neighbor’s testimony and the recording of her 911 call. The jury determined that to be
an inaccurate account, i.e., that it did not support the idea Mr. Sepulveda was the
primary aggressor and had attempted to strangle L.M.

In fact, the jury ultimately

acquitted Mr. Sepulveda of attempted strangulation. (R., p.404.) Thus, the State’s
argument on harmlessness based on the purported strength of the evidence is
disproved by the jury verdict. Therefore, it should be rejected as contrary to the facts in
the record. Either way, the State has failed to carry its burden of proving this error
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
III.
The District Court Violated Mr. Sepulveda’s Constitutional Right To Be Free From
Double Jeopardy Under The Idaho Constitution By Entering Convictions And Imposing
Sentences For Each Charge In The 2014 Case When One Of Those Charges Was
Alleged As The Means By Which Each Of The Other Two Charges Was Committed
A.

As Charged, The Intimidating Charge And The Violation Of No Contact Order
Charges Are Based On The Same Factual Circumstances, And So, Are Included
Offenses
In responding to Mr. Sepulveda’s double jeopardy claim, the State raises an idea

in a footnote which is, in actuality, critical to understanding the proper analysis for this
issue. The State remarks that “[Mr.] Sepulveda argues that felony intimidation of a
witness is somehow a lesser included offense of misdemeanor attempted violation of a
no-contact order.” (Resp. Br., p.31 n.7.) The State’s focus on the designation of felony
and misdemeanor is misplaced and demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of
the doctrine surrounding included offenses and double jeopardy.
The concept of “lesser” and “greater” in terms of “included offenses” represents
an attempt to define the scope of the competing charges – which offense encompasses
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which. That determination has nothing to do with the potential penalties associated with
the competing charges. Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, there is no
problem with inattentive driving subjecting a person to an arguably greater penalty than
reckless driving despite the statutory designation that inattentive driving is a “lesser
included offense” of reckless driving.

State v. Parker, 141 Idaho 775, 779 (2005).

Therefore, the terms “greater” and “lesser” as they refer to included offenses are
somewhat misleading, as demonstrated by the State’s remark in footnote 7. See, e.g.,
State v. Gilman, 105 Idaho 891, 896 (Ct. App. 1983) (“Special care must be taken when
instructing a jury about an offense which is ‘included’ in the crime charged but which
actually carries an equal or greater potential penalty.

Use of the term ‘lesser’ to

describe such an offense may be misleading.”).
Rather, the fundamental rule is that “[w]hatever the sequence may be, the Fifth
Amendment forbids successive prosecution and cumulative punishment for a greater
and lesser included offense.” Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977). As such, if a
felony is alleged as the means by which a misdemeanor is committed, the felony is still
the “included” offense since, under the Idaho Constitution, an “included offense” is
simply “one which is necessarily committed in the commission of another offense; or
one, the essential elements of which are charged in the information as the manner or
means by which the offense was committed.” State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 434
(1980).
The language in the charging document in this case reveals that Mr. Sepulveda
was convicted and sentenced for multiple counts which constitute included offenses
under Idaho’s pleading theory, and thus, reveal a double jeopardy violation under the
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Idaho Constitution. Specifically, the means by which Mr. Sepulveda is alleged to have
attempted to violate the no-contact orders is the same as the means by which he is
alleged to have intimidated a witness – contacting other persons to ask them to relay
messages to subject of the no-contact order.
The State contends that, because the elements of one charge are not repeated
in the other charge, there is no double jeopardy violation under the pleading test:
[Mr.] Sepulveda’s manner of committing intimidating a witness . . . makes
no reference to the existence of a no contact order. The means by which
[Mr.] Sepulveda committed attempted violation of a no contact order . . .
makes no reference to whether L.M. was a witness or whether
[Mr.] Sepulveda intended to prevent her from testifying.
(Resp. Br., p.33.)

That argument is flawed on several levels, and so, should be

rejected.
First, it improperly subdivides the course of conduct at issue. As the Idaho Court
of Appeals has recently explained, subdividing a course of conduct into multiple
segments, so as to dodge the limits of the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy, is inappropriate. State v. Moffat, 154 Idaho 529, 533-34 (Ct. App. 2013)
(following the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown). The State’s argument in this case
asks this Court to do precisely that: look only at the message Mr. Sepulveda allegedly
wanted conveyed (say certain things at trial), and hold that constitutes the intimidating a
witness, then look separately at the person to whom Mr. Sepulveda wanted that
message conveyed (L.M.), and hold that constitutes attempt to violate a no-contact
order. (See Resp. Br., p.33.) That is inappropriate. Id.; cf. Brown, 432 U.S. at 169
(“The Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile guarantee that prosecutors can
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avoid its limitations by the simple expedient of dividing a single crime into a series of
temporal or spatial units.”)
Second, adopting the State’s argument on the application of the pleading test
would essentially render Idaho’s pleading test to be coextensive with the federal
elements test, focusing only on whether the elements of the two offenses are the same.
(See Resp. Br., p.33 (arguing there is no violation because the indicating charge does
not include the element of a valid no contact order and because the no contact order
charges do not include the element of a testifying witness).)

However, the Idaho

Supreme Court has made it clear those two tests are not the same:

“Different

jurisdictions follow a variety of approaches for defining lesser included offenses. At one
extreme, the federal courts apply the ‘strict elements’ approach and look only to the
statutory elements of the crime charged. . . . The ‘pleading theory,’ which Idaho has
adopted, is an intermediate approach.” State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837, 841 (2013).
Thus, Idaho’s test is broader (i.e., protects in more situations) than its federal
counterpart.
Rather, the State’s argument appears to be an attempt to hybridize the elements
test and Idaho’s pleading test, which would track with the interpretation of Thompson in
such cases as State v. Stewart, 149 Idaho 383 (2010), State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742
(1991), overruled on other grounds, and Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197 (1986)
(hereinafter, “the Sivak interpretation”).

See State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 375

(Ct. App. 2011) (discussing the confusion that existed in Idaho law as a result of the
Sivak interpretation). However, the Corbus Court also noted that it was not actually
clear whether, in Sivak for example, the Supreme Court was analyzing the double
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jeopardy claim under the federal or Idaho constitution. Id. at 373 n.3. Regardless, the
Sivak interpretation provided there would be no double jeopardy violation unless “all the
elements of [the included offense] are contained within the elements of [the overarching
offense].” Id. Thus, when the Corbus Court tried to apply the pleading test, it found
that, if Thompson were purely applied to the facts in that case, there would be a double
jeopardy violation, but if the Sivak interpretation were given effect, there would not be
double jeopardy violation under those same facts. Id.
However, in more recent decisions, the Idaho Supreme Court has been clearer
as to the proper application of Idaho’s pleading test. See, e.g., McKinney, 153 Idaho
837; State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525 (2011).

As the Court of Appeals thereafter

explained, those recent decisions have resolved the confusion caused by the Sivak
interpretation as the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed that Thompson itself is the proper
standard. See, e.g., State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 658 n.3 (Ct. App. 2014). Thus, by
employing a pure application of Thompson, the Idaho Supreme Court implicitly rejected
the Sivak interpretation.
For example, in Flegel, the Idaho Supreme Court explained the elements-based
analysis is the proper analysis under the federal Constitution. Flegel, 151 Idaho at 527.
However, when it turned to the Idaho Constitution, the Supreme Court clarified that the
pleading theory “holds that an offense is an included offense if it is alleged in the
information [or indictment] as a means or element of the commission of the higher
offense.” Id.; cf. McKinney 153 Idaho at 841. The important result is that “the Idaho
Supreme Court again applied the Thompson pleading test to a double jeopardy claim
arising under the Idaho Constitution, without mentioning the statutory elements test.”
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Moad, 156 Idaho at 658 n.3 (emphasis added). Therefore, the State’s argument, which
would employ an elements-based analysis as part of Idaho’s pleading test, is
erroneous.
The State’s argument in that regard is not saved by the Idaho Supreme Court’s
decision in State v. Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho 647 (2014). (See Resp. Br., pp.32-33.)
In that case, the Supreme Court explained that “[t]he Defendant also asserts that the
conspiracy and the trafficking charges were the same offense under the pleading
theory, although he does not present any argument supporting that assertion . . . ,”
apart from, the Court surmised, the fact they were both based on his possession of 400
grams or more of methamphetamine.

Id.

Because the argument under the Idaho

pleading test was not clear, the Court’s discussion of that topic appears to be dicta.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s discussion of the Idaho pleading test reveals
the State’s reliance thereon to be misplaced. The Supreme Court explained that the
perceived argument in that case would be based on a misreading of the charging
documents, which alleged two separate offenses:

a conspiracy to possess

methamphetamine and actually possessing methamphetamine (charged as “trafficking”
because of the amount of methamphetamine allegedly possessed).

Id.

Actually

possessing the methamphetamine, while ostensibly the goal of the conspiracy, was not
the means by which the conspiracy – the agreement to engage in the criminal
enterprise combined with the intent to actually follow through on the agreement, see,
e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 137 – was committed. See Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho
at 649.

Nor was making agreements to engage in an enterprise to possess

methamphetamine the means by which the defendant actually came into possession of
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the methamphetamine. See id. Rather, the Supreme Court explained, the mention of
the 400 grams in the conspiracy charge was simply to identify the object of the
conspiracy. Id. As a result, the trafficking charge and the conspiracy charge were not
included offenses under the pleading theory. Id.
The State overstates the scope of that discussion by contenting Sanchez-Castro
stands for the idea “that simply because two counts refer to the same actions, those two
counts [do not] necessarily violate double jeopardy (Resp. Br., p.32 (emphasis added).)
That reading is mistaken because the Supreme Court determined that the two charges
were not referring to the “same actions.” Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho at 649. The
determination that they were referring to different actions is the premise for its entire
discussion of the pleading theory. See id.
Rather, it is the Court of Appeals’ decision in Corbus which exemplifies how
Idaho’s pleading test under Thompson operates when the charges do refer to the same
actions. In Corbus, the Court explained:
The language used in both counts lays out the same factual
circumstances as the basis for each offense. The means by which Corbus
eluded the police—driving in excess of 100 mph, passing other vehicles,
turning off his headlights after sunset, and endangering the person or
property of another—are the same means by which Corbus drove
recklessly.
Corbus, 151 Idaho at 375. Because the charges did, in fact, refer to the same actions,
the Court of Appeals concluded: “Under the Thompson formulation and the information
with which Corbus was charged, therefore, reckless driving is a lesser included offense
of eluding a police officer and Corbus’s conviction and punishment for both offenses
was in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Idaho Constitution.”

Id.

Contrarily, in Sanchez-Castro, where there were two factual circumstances – first, the
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agreement to join in the unlawful enterprise, followed at some later point, by actually
coming into possession of the methamphetamine – no double jeopardy violation
occurred. See Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho at 649.
Mr. Sepulveda’s case is similar to Corbus as the charging document in his case
alleged the same factual circumstances as the basis for Count I and Count II (asking
another person, L.M.’s sister, to relay a message to L.M.), and the same factual
circumstances as the basis for Count I and Count III (asking another person,
Ms. Cameron, to relay a message to L.M.). (R., p.278.) Therefore, contrary to the
State’s assertion under its erroneously-narrow and already-rejected application of the
Idaho pleading theory, the dual convictions and punishments in those two respects
violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Idaho Constitution. That error is plain from
the face of the record and it obviously prejudiced Mr. Sepulveda.

Therefore, it

constitutes fundamental error.
B.

Remedy
The State provides no argument against Mr. Sepulveda’s analysis on the proper

remedy in this case, as it only argues that there was no error. (See generally Resp.
Br., pp.27-34; see App. Br., p.27.) Therefore, this Court should vacate the problematic
conviction – the intimidating charge, as it was charged as the means by which
Mr. Sepulveda violated the no-contact order.

See Thompson, 101 Idaho at 436

(affirming the order dismissing the included charge).
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IV.
The Accumulated Errors In This Case Require Reversal Even If This Court Determines
Them To Be Individually Harmless
The State contends that the cumulative error doctrine should not be applied in
this case under its belief that Mr. Sepulveda has not shown any errors to accumulate.
(Resp. Br., p.34.) As demonstrated supra, the State’s belief is mistaken. There were
several violations of Mr. Sepulveda’s rights in this case.
The State also contends that this Court should find the accumulated errors
harmless in light of what it considers to be the weight of the other evidence. (Resp.
Br., p.34.) That argument applies the wrong standard, and so, it is contrary to Idaho
Supreme Court and Untied States Supreme Court precedent, as it effectively asks this
Court to sit as a thirteenth juror and conclude that, absent those errors, the verdict
would be the same.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the Chapman harmless error test is the
applicable test in the cumulative error context. See, e.g., State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559,
572-73 (2007). Therefore, as discussed in depth in Section II(D), supra, the State’s
argument asks this Court to deny Mr. Sepulveda’s right to a jury trial and speculate what
a verdict absent the error might be absent the error, rather than, as is proper, evaluate
whether the cumulated errors surely did not contribute to the verdict actually rendered in
this case. See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279. For the same reasons discussed supra, the
State has failed to carry its burden in that regard, and so, this Court should vacate the
tainted judgments of conviction in these cases.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Sepulveda respectfully requests this Court vacate his convictions and
remand these cases for further proceedings.
DATED this 25th day of January, 2016.

___________/s/______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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